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ABSTRACT This paper evaluates the impact of globalisation on tax bases of countries at varying
stages of development. We see globalisation as a process that induces countries to embrace
greater trade and ﬁnancial integration. This in turn should shift their tax revenue from ‘easy to
collect’ taxes (tariﬀs and seigniorage) towards ‘hard to collect’ taxes (value added and income
taxes). We ﬁnd that trade and ﬁnancial openness have a positive association with the ‘hard to
collect’ taxes, and a negative association with the easy to collect taxes.
I. Introduction
A salient feature of the last 20 years has been the phenomenal increase in trade and
ﬁnancial integration of developing countries alongside declining inﬂation rates. The
greater openness has been reﬂected both in de facto and de jure measures of trade
and ﬁnancial integration. These trends are consistent with developing countries
recognising that, in the era of globalisation, the opportunity costs of inward
orientation have increased to a level justifying outward oriented reforms. These
reforms include trade liberalisation (reducing tariﬀs, quotas and other non-tariﬀ
trade barriers); ﬁnancial liberalisation (reducing capital controls and ﬁnancial
repression); and macroeconomic stabilisations (reducing inﬂation, reducing thereby
the ﬁnancial spread and the cost of borrowing). All of these reforms have a common
ﬁscal denominator – they erode the tax rates from what we call ‘easy to collect’ taxes.
These are the traditional sources of revenue used by developing countries including
tariﬀs, inﬂation tax and ﬁnancial repression.1 Some of these eﬀects may be
compensated by the higher tariﬀ tax base induced by higher imports volume
propagated by trade liberalisations. Yet, for countries that start with very high tariﬀ
rates, reducing drastically tariﬀ rates, the tax cut eﬀect may dominate the tax base
expansion eﬀect.2 In these circumstances, globalisation may entail a negative ﬁscal
shock to developing countries, shrinking the tax revenue from traditional taxes.
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Short of matching the drop in these taxes by a corresponding cut in ﬁscal
expenditure, aﬀected countries need to increase revenue. To do this, they must rely
on alternative ‘hard to collect’ sources such as Value Added Taxes (VAT), income
taxes, sales taxes, etc. These hard to collect taxes, unlike tariﬀs administered at
centralised locations (seaports, airports, etc.) and implicit taxation by means of
seigniorage and ﬁnancial repression, need signiﬁcant investment in tax collection
infrastructure and spending resources on monitoring and enforcement.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate empirically the impact of globalisation
throughout the 1980s–1990s on the vector of taxes collected by countries at varying
stages of development. We view the greater trade and ﬁnancial integration as the
outcome of deeper processes often dubbed ‘globalisation’. Taking the globalisation
process ﬁrst as exogenous for the purpose of the present investigation, we trace its
impact on the tax base, and the ultimate collection of taxes. The factors explaining
globalisation include faster, more reliable and cheaper delivery of goods and services
across borders, and advances in information technology that allow cheaper
fragmentation of production via FDI and outsourcing, and so forth. Speciﬁcally,
we quantify and explain the degree to which globalisation has contributed to the
diminishing ﬁscal base of developing countries, and the degree to which these
countries managed to switch from the traditional easy to collect taxes to new hard to
collect taxes. We trace factors explaining the heterogeneity of the negative ﬁscal
shock induced by globalisation and thus explaining the depth of the ﬁscal adjustment
accomplished already by countries at varying levels of development.
Figure 1(a and b) compares trade openness and ﬁnancial integration between the
1980s and the 1990s for developing countries segregated into ﬁve regions.3 The
comparison conﬁrms that the globalisation trend is indeed global – openness
increased remarkably in all regions. Figure 1 reports the decline in the tariﬀ and
inﬂation rates during that period. On balance, the average tariﬀ and inﬂation rates
declined more in regions where the rates were above the average during the 1980s,
indicating convergence of rates to a lower common denominator. Further insight
about these developments is gained by comparing the revenue/GDP during the ﬁrst
ﬁve years of the 1980s to that during the last ﬁve years of the 1990s. Figure 1(e)
indicates, as percentages of GDP, a major drop in the revenue from easy to collect
taxes (seigniorageþ tariﬀ), and a sizeable increase – though at a smaller rate – in the
revenue from hard to collect taxes (VATþ income). While the drop in easy to collect
eﬀective tax rates is more pronounced for high income countries, the greater initial
base of hard to collect taxes in these countries relative to developing countries implies
a net increase in total taxes of 6 per cent in the ﬁrst group, and a drop of 2 per cent in
the second. The position of four South Asian countries4 is in between the high
income and the developing countries: the large increase in the revenue from hard to
collect taxes more than oﬀsets the drop in the revenue from the easy to collect taxes,
increasing total tax revenue by 4 per cent. These ﬁgures mask signiﬁcant
heterogeneity of the adjustment across countries, an issue that will be investigated
in this paper using regression analyses.
Before turning to the empirical work, we note the sizeable theoretical literature
and growing empirical research on tax eﬀort, tax evasion and avoidance, and
administration (see Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) and Slemrod (2007) for a
comprehensive survey and discussion). Applying cost–beneﬁt analysis, models
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inspired by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) explained the interplay between tax
underpayment and the tax authority’s eﬀort to identify and limit tax frauds. This
occurs in circumstances where agents gamble by underpaying taxes, and where the
probability of detection and the resultant penalties are determined by the resources
committed by the regulator, and the eﬃcacy of institutions. These models identify
Figure 1. (a) (Exportsþ Imports)/GDP. The actual trade share ranges from 0 to 1; (b) Index of
capital mobility. The index ranges from 0 to 100; (c) Tariﬀ rates. Weighted average rates; (d)
Inﬂation Logarithms of the CPI inﬂation rates; (e) Tax/GDP adjustment (%) from 1980–1984
to 1995–1999.
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several factors explaining tax underpayment, including the tax burden, the
stringiness and eﬃcacy of enforcement, the penalties associated with tax under-
payment and the degree of risk aversion. Using Chilean tax revenues to estimate the
impact of changes in enforcement spending, Engel et al. (2001) found that US$1 of
additional enforcement spending increases VAT revenues by US$31, and a 10 per
cent increase in spending could reduce evasion from its current rate of 23 to 20 per
cent. Reliable evasion estimates are diﬃcult to obtain because of the limited
availability of data. The empirical assessments of tax eﬀort and avoidance frequently
rely on macro estimates of the ‘black economy’, quantifying the revenue lost due to
underpayment of taxes.5 Some studies moved beyond inferring tax underpayment by
means of macro methods, using information from tax audits evaluating compliance.
Not surprisingly, the estimates of VAT non-compliance vary across countries, from
about 2.5 per cent in the Netherlands to over 34 per cent in Italy on average during
1994–1996 (Nam et al., 2003). While informative, the above methods provide us with
little guidance for dealing with the impact of a common macro shock, like
globalisation, on the tax revenue in a panel of countries. Our approach is to
implement an extended version of the methodology used by Cukierman et al. (1992)
for the assessment of international use of inﬂation tax, adding controls associated
with the impact of globalisation on easy to collect taxes.
We outline the conceptual framework in the following section. Data and descriptive
statistics are presented in Section III. Section IV reports the benchmark panel
regressions. We provide robustness checks together with quantiﬁcation of the economic
signiﬁcance in Section V. Section VI closes the paper with concluding remarks.
II. Conceptual Framework
Our empirical speciﬁcation controls for variables suggested by a model outlined in
the earlier version of our paper (see Appendix A of Aizenman and Jinjarak, 2006).
Our benchmark model is adopted from Cukierman et al. (1992), explaining the
obstacles to tax reforms in polarised countries, characterised by political instability.
They focused on the case where ﬁscal revenue can be raised by taxes associated with
collection costs (income taxes), and implicit taxes where the collection cost is zero
(inﬂation tax). They assumed implementation lags – the present policy maker
determines the eﬃciency of the tax system next period. This implies strategic choice
of the tax system’s eﬃciency – the current policy maker may choose an ineﬃcient
future tax system in order to constrain the ﬁscal revenue available to future policy
makers. This prevents future policy makers from spending in ways that are viewed as
inferior from the vantage point of the present policy maker. We add endogenous tax
evasion, and model the optimal enforcement of the hard to collect taxes. Following
Cukierman et al. (1992), the model suggests the following types of controls:
1. Macro variables dealing with the tax base and with the level of economic
development.
2. Controls dealing with the sectoral composition of the economy, reﬂecting
diﬀerential costs of tax evasion and collection across economic activities.
3. Variables dealing with political instability, polarisation and quality of
institutions, reﬂecting the model’s prediction that the present tax infrastructure
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reﬂects past public investment, which in turn is aﬀected by the incentives facing
the previous administrations.
Speciﬁcally, the variables we use are:
1. Globalisation factors: our conjecture is that, if globalisation reduces the ﬁscal
revenue from traditional taxes, it would set in motion forces that will increase
the collection from alternative, less traditional taxes, including the VAT.
Consequently, we expect the globalisation factors, measured by Trade Openness
and Financial Openness, to increase VAT collection and reduce seigniorage and
tariﬀ revenue (the last result would hold if the adverse revenue eﬀect of lower
tariﬀs dominates the increase in tariﬀ revenue due to the growth of imports, a
conjecture that is veriﬁed as part of the empirical study).6 Slemrod (2004) found
that up to the early 1990s measures of openness were negatively associated with
statutory corporate tax rates, although not with revenues collected as a fraction
of GDP. One problem with using statutory rates in the developing countries
context has to do with tax incentives. At any rate, our study is closely related to
that of Slemrod (2004), but we emphasise eﬀective tax collection.
2. Agriculture share: easy to collect taxes should be applied more heavily in a
country with larger agricultural share in GDP, where the collection of income
and VAT is challenged by the widespread distribution of production among
geographically diﬀused farmers. Another possibility is that in countries where
the manufacturing sector is relatively small, it is optimal for ﬁrms either to have
small size to evade oﬃcial detection and taxes, or to have a very large size to
overwhelm the system and extract more than proportionate beneﬁts.7
3. Urbanisation: we expect that it is more diﬃcult to administer and collect hard to
collect taxes in less urbanised and more rural countries. However, it is also
possible that urbanisation is associated with a larger underground economy,
inducing the use of seigniorage to tax such an informal sector. Equally important
in industrial countries is the issue of income shifting through incorporation by
high-income individuals, though it is still an open question to what degree this
practice applies to developing countries.
4. Institutional quality and political durability: we expect that countries with better
institutional quality and more stable politics tend to invest more in the tax
collection infrastructure, collecting more from hard to collect taxes and less from
easy to collect taxes.8
Suppressing for simplicity the time and cross-section subscripts, the estimation
equation is given by Equation 1 with the expected sign of coeﬃcients indicated below
the regressors;
(1)
Tax
revenue
¼ f [ Trade
Openness,
Financial
Openness,
Institutional
Quality,
Political
Durability,
Urbanisation, Agriculture
Share
]
hard to
collect
þ þ þ þ þ 7
easy to
collect
7 7 7 7 7 þ
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III. Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our sample spans from 1980 to 1999 over 60 countries. The Data Appendix provides
sources and details of the sample. A third of these countries have observations across
the 1980s and the 1990s suﬃcient for panel regressions. Figure 2(a) reports total tax/
GDP in the early 1980s (measured horizontally) and in the late 1990s (measured
vertically). The further away is a country from the 45-degree ray, the greater is the
change over time in that country. Figure 2(b and c) reports the GDP share of
revenue colleted by easy to collect taxes and by hard to collect taxes. For most
developing countries, the share of easy to collect declined, whereas the share of hard
to collect taxes increased. The average total tax revenue/GDP declined from 0.182 to
0.176. The average revenue/GDP of easy to collect taxes declined during the period
from 0.060 to 0.046 (see Figure 2(b)); whereas average tax revenue/GDP of hard to
collect taxes increased slightly from 0.086 to 0.093 (see Figure 2(c)). Interestingly, the
overall cross-country patterns are non-linear, characterised by an inverted U-shape
curve (see the quadratic regression lines in Figure 2(b) and 2(c)). In both ﬁgures, the
left arch of the ﬁtted U curve is close to the 45-degree ray for countries below the
sample mean, with increasing divergence from the 45-degree ray for countries above
the sample mean. The concavity of the cross-country patterns is more pronounced in
Figure 2(b) suggesting that countries that had previously relied heavily on the easy to
collect taxes confronted greater losses. Figure 2(c) suggests that countries below the
mean of revenue from hard to collect taxes in the early 1980s ended up increasing the
revenue in the late 1990s. Both ﬁgures are consistent with the notion that
globalisation entails ﬁscal convergence. Figure 2(d) compares the total government
expenditure/GDP between the early 1980s and the late 1990s and shows that the
average drops from 0.264 to 0.234.
To gain perspectives about the net adjustment, Figure 3(a) reports tax revenues as
percentages of GDP in the early 1980s across income groups. Most of the variation
across the four income groups was in the revenue from hard to collect taxes, which
was about 8 per cent of GDP for the low income, progressing upward and reaching
17 per cent of GDP in the high income countries. In contrast, there was little
variation in the revenue from easy to collect taxes across the income groups: it was 6
per cent of GDP for the low income and 5 per cent of GDP for the high income
countries. The total oﬃcial tax collection to GDP in these four income groups
mimics the patterns of the hard to collect taxes: it was about 16 per cent of GDP for
the low income group, progressing upward with GDP per capita and reaching 28 per
cent of GDP for the high income group. Figure 3(b) reports the changes in total
taxes/GDP, and in easy to collect and hard to collect taxes/GDP between the early
1980s and the late 1990s across the four income groups. Overall, the record is mixed.
The drop in the revenue from easy to collect taxes was larger for the higher income
groups (in fact the revenue from easy to collect taxes went up for the middle income
group by 8.4%). Both the high income and the middle income groups managed to
increase the revenue from the hard to collect taxes signiﬁcantly (11% and 40%,
respectively) and increased the total tax/GDP by 6 per cent and 10 per cent,
respectively. The increase in revenue from the hard to collect taxes was rather timid
for the upper and the low income countries (13% and 12%, respectively), less than
what was needed to compensate for the drop in revenue from easy to collect taxes.
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This induced a drop in total tax revenue of 3 per cent for the upper income countries
and 17 per cent for the low income developing countries. Seemingly, countries
exhibit complex non-linear patterns of adjustment, where the middle-income
Figure 3. (a) Tax/GDP, 1980–1984; (b) Adjustment of tax/GDP, % change of 1995–1999 from
1980–84; (c) Tax/GDP, 1990–1994; (d) Adjustment of tax/GDP, % change of 1995–1999 from
1990–1994.
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developing countries adjust more easily than the upper- and the lower-income
developing countries.
Figure 3(c and d) summarises the changes in tax revenues in the 1990s. Figure 3(c)
reports the patterns of tax revenues in the early 1990s, and Figure 3(d) traces the tax
revenue changes between 1990–1994 and 1995–1999. The middle-income countries
experienced a sizeable contraction in the easy to collect tax revenue (by about 35%),
reducing the overall tax revenue by about 1 per cent. The low-income countries
experienced a similar drop in total tax revenue, accounted for by a smaller drop in
the easy to collect tax revenue (by about 10%).
Globalisation, being a common shock, may induce ﬁscal convergence across
countries. Figure 4 conﬁrms this conjecture. It shows a gradual decline in the
coeﬃcient of variation of tax revenues/GDP during the 1980s–1990s. This eﬀect
diﬀers across taxes: the coeﬃcients of variation of seigniorage and tariﬀ revenue/
GDP during the 1980s–1990s declined by about 40 per cent, as opposed to only
about 4 per cent for the hard to collect taxes. At any rate, the reductions in the
coeﬃcients from 1980–1984 to 1995–1999 are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent
level. Apparently, improving the performance of the hard to collect taxes seems more
challenging than reducing the use of easy to collect sources of revenue.9
IV. Benchmark Panel Estimation
For our regression analysis, an important issue is how to measure globalisation
factors. While we take the globalisation process, measured by trade and ﬁnancial
openness, as exogenous factors inducing ﬁscal adjustment in the next period, we use
instrumental methods to control for endogeneity of trade openness to geographic
and structural factors advanced in the gravity equation literature.10 Elsewhere,
applying instrumental variables for trade openness has been used by Frankel and
Romer (1999) to study the impact of trade openness on income per capita, Hall and
Jones (1999) to study the impact of social infrastructure on income per capita, and
Persson and Tabellini (2003) to study the impact of political institutions on
Figure 4. Fiscal convergence. Coeﬃcients of variation, measured over non-overlapping ﬁve-
year periods from 1980–1999.
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productivity and growth. Following Frankel and Romer (1999), we use the gravity
instrument for trade openness, which is constructed from geographical determinants
of bilateral trade, including log of distance, log of partner country population, log of
land area, dummy variables for common language, common land border and
landlocked status. After estimating the gravity model, we aggregate the exponent of
the ﬁtted values across bilateral trading partners to arrive at an estimate of total
trade share for a given country, dubbing it as the ‘gravity trade share’. Our gravity
trade share estimation explains around 35 per cent of variation in the actual trade
shares from 1975 to 1999. The correlation between the actual and gravity trade
shares is 44 per cent across countries. There is also an increasing trend of the gravity
trade share across countries over the sample period.11 In what follows throughout,
we shall use this gravity trade share as a measure of trade openness to estimate its
impact on tax base adjustments. Deﬁnition of other variables in the regressions can
be found in the Data Appendix.
Table 1 reports the benchmark panel regressions. For each of the tax equations,
we use ﬁxed eﬀects estimation controlling for ﬁrst-order autoregressive disturbances.
We take into account reverse causality from ﬁscal adjustment by lagging by one year
the globalisation factors and explanatory variables in the regression analysis.
Because our estimation is quite demanding of data, only 20 of 60 countries have
suﬃcient data.12 At any rate, the benchmark panel estimation yields encouraging
results. We ﬁnd that trade and ﬁnancial openness have a positive relationship with
hard to collect taxes, and a negative relationship with the easy to collect taxes. As a
group, hard to collect tax revenue responds positively to trade and ﬁnancial
openness. VAT and Income Taxes are also associated with the globalisation factors
with the expected positive sign. Though the coeﬃcient of Trade Openness on Income
Taxes and the coeﬃcient of Financial Openness on VAT are found to be
insigniﬁcant, these ﬁndings are not entirely surprising given the ongoing debates
on how to eﬀectively tax corporations and ﬁnancial services.
Of the easy to collect taxes expected to be hard hit by globalisation factors, only
Seigniorage is found to respond signiﬁcantly in statistical term to Trade Openness.
Except for the coeﬃcient of Financial Openness on Tariﬀs, the components of easy
to collect taxes respond to globalisation with a correct negative sign. A negative
association between Trade Openness and Tariﬀs is consistent with previous studies
on trade liberalisation and tariﬀ revenue (see, for example, Baunsgaard and Keen
(2005)). Financial Openness is negatively associated with Seigniorage but positively
with Tariﬀs; the latter, though insigniﬁcant, may be justiﬁed by a possibility that
openness and development of the ﬁnancial system help to improve trade mis-
invoicing problems. As a group, easy to collect tax revenue responds strongly
negatively to Trade Openness, but insigniﬁcantly positive to Financial Openness.
Turning to other control variables, we ﬁnd that better Institutional Quality is
associated with a lower use of easy to collect taxes. VAT and Tariﬀs respond
negatively to Political Durability. Although the negative relationships of VAT with
Political Durability and Institutional Quality seem counterintuitive, it is not
impossible given the diﬃculty in implementing and adjusting VAT collection for
industrial countries facing even more organised and sophisticated tax frauds.13 As
expected, Urbanisation increases VAT collection, but we do not ﬁnd supportive
evidence that Urbanisation facilitates the use of Seigniorage to tax the informal
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sector. Tariﬀ revenue is found to be increasing with the Agriculture Share in GDP, in
line with the theoretical prediction.
Overall the benchmark regressions are supporting our conjecture that above and
beyond institutional, political and structural factors, the globalisation forces
inﬂuence the size and composition of the tax base and tax revenue. One issue with
this set of estimations is that we have only 20 countries each with six or seven years
of observations. The Jarque-Bera and Shapiro-Wilk residuals tests reject the null of
normality in all except for residuals from the VAT equation. With such limited data
availability, our hopes lie in the more robust estimation technique in the following
section.
V. Robustness and Economic Signiﬁcance
One way to improve upon the benchmark regressions is to take into account a joint
determination among easy to collect and hard to collect taxes, and that diﬀerent taxes
have diﬀerent evasion characteristics, so that the optimal tax mix and its transitions
emerge naturally. Zellner’s (1962) Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) is
appropriate in this context because it captures the eﬃciency due to the correlation
of the disturbances across equations. Since we do not model tax equations as having
a structural relationship in the sense that one type of tax appears as an explanatory
variable for the others, each revenue equation is, by itself, a classical regression, and
therefore the parameters could be estimated consistently, if not eﬃciently, by
the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) (Ruud, 2000) as we do in the previous section. In
a cross-section context, the OLS and generalised least squares (GLS) on the whole
system are identical when the equations have identical explanatory variables
(Greene, 2002). In a panel data framework, Baltagi (2005) shows that a block-
diagonal covariance matrix between the disturbances of diﬀerent equations makes
GLS on the whole system equivalent to GLS on each equation separately, but not
when the same explanatory variables appear in each equation. To directly apply
SUR with a set of our benchmark regressions of the previous section, we use the
same explanatory variables. In order to gain estimation eﬃciency from SUR, we
develop a two-step approach. In the ﬁrst step, we generate a new set of interaction
variables between globalisation factors and other control variables based on their
statistical signiﬁcance in the benchmark regressions of Table 1. In the second step,
we apply SUR to the set of benchmark regressions adding the interaction variables,
the inclusion of which varies across regressions. Not only does this two-step
procedure allow us to capture estimation eﬃciency from SUR, but we also get a
further insight from interacting globalisation factors with institutional, political, and
structural variables. Essentially, we can then understand, for example, whether
economic integration aﬀects countries with a high level of institutions diﬀerently to
countries with a low level.
Table 2 reports SUR estimates with interactions. Besides the control variables
outlined above, we also include a one-year lag of the dependent variable to improve
the ﬁt and control for possible dynamics of tax collection. Coeﬃcients of the main
explanatory variables are similar to those found in the benchmark regressions. The
coeﬃcient of Political Durability on Income Taxes and the coeﬃcient of
Urbanisation on Seigniorage are now statistically signiﬁcant. The latter thus
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supports the conjecture that urbanisation is associated with an underground
economy, inducing the use of seigniorage to tax this informal sector. SUR with
interaction variables explains around 40–90 per cent of variation in the data. We also
ﬁnd that the normality of residuals cannot be rejected for the VAT equation based
on the Jarque-Bera and Shapiro-Wilk tests, and that the variance of the residuals are
independent of the explanatory variables for the hard to collect and easy to collect
SUR regressions based on the Breusch-Pagan test. Although the improvement of
these SUR estimates upon the benchmark estimation is rather small across the board
in term of residuals normality, we believe that the inclusion of control variables
suggested in the literature is comprehensive and thus a future expansion of country–
year observations beyond the current sample will help increase the overall eﬃciency
of the estimation.
Fortunately we gain several further insights from the interaction variables.
Seigniorage responds more negatively to higher Trade Openness and Institutional
Quality. That is, countries with low level of Institutional Quality have found the
ﬁscal adjustment more challenging, frequently ending with diminishing tax revenue.
When Political Durability is longer, Trade Openness has a larger positive impact on
VAT and hard to collect tax revenues, and a larger negative impact on Tariﬀs.
Furthermore VAT also responds favourably to Trade Openness when countries have
a high level of Urbanisation. Countries with a higher Agriculture Share in GDP scale
down Tariﬀ revenue in response to Trade Openness, and Income Taxes in response
to greater Financial Openness. Income taxes of countries with a higher level of
urbanisation tend to respond positively to Financial Openness. We are intrigued to
ﬁnd that hard to collect tax revenue tends to fall when Political Durability and
Financial Openness are both at a high level. The rapid ﬁnancial liberalisations of the
1990s seem to pose a greater ﬁscal challenge on a relatively durable government.
We conclude our empirical analysis by quantifying the economic signiﬁcance of
the globalisation factors. Table 3 summarises the impact of a one standard deviation
change of the globalisation factors on taxes/GDP. The calculation is based on the
SUR estimates reported in Table 2.14 Summing up its individual and interaction
eﬀects, Trade Openness increases hard to collect tax revenue by 4.5 per cent, of which
two-thirds of the impact comes from interactions with Political Durability. The
individual eﬀect of Trade Openness is responsible for a reduction of 8 per cent in easy
to collect tax revenue. In response to Trade Openness, VAT increases 3.1 per cent,
Tariﬀs and Seigniorage drop by 2.4 per cent and 4.1 per cent, respectively. About two-
thirds of the impact on VAT is a result of the interactions, further highlighting the
role of administration costs in collection. Financial Openness has a small negative
eﬀect on hard to collect tax revenue, mainly from interactions with Political Durability
and Agriculture Share, partially an intriguing result discussed earlier. In total, the
globalisation factors increase, as percentages of GDP, hard to collect revenue by 3 per
cent and decrease easy to collect revenue by 8 per cent. Following a one standard
deviation increase of globalisation factors, VAT increases by 3.1 per cent, Income
Taxes increase by 0.7 per cent, Tariﬀs drop by 2.4 per cent, and Seigniorage drops by
4.6 per cent. Taken together with our earlier discussion on the overall tax revenue
adjustment, these numbers imply that the globalisation factors are responsible for
about a ﬁfth of the 16 per cent increase of hard to collect base/GDPand two-thirds of the
12 per cent drop of easy to collect base/GDP in developing countries.
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VI. Concluding Remarks
Our study found that globalisation has imposed new ﬁscal challenges on developing
countries, forcing them to scale down traditional easy to collect revenue sources.
A good share of developing countries managed the adjustment by shifting the tax
revenue to the hard to collect taxes. Yet, countries with a low level of institutional
quality have found the adjustment more challenging, frequently ending with a drop
in the net tax revenue/GDP. Trade and ﬁnancial openness exert an economically
signiﬁcant impact on tax revenue/GDP over the period of our investigation. A ﬁfth
of the increase in hard to collect taxes/GDP and two-thirds of the drop in easy to
collect taxes/GDP can be traced back to the individual and interaction eﬀects of
globalisation factors.
This paper is another step in understanding the evolution of tax revenue, tax base
and tax eﬀort across countries. Among ﬁscal issues in the global context, we have yet
to touch on the consequences of competition over tax revenue among ﬁscal
institutions. Our study has also focused only on half of the adjustment, as we do
not include government expenditure as a potential determinant of tax policy. It is
possible that part of the adjustment of hard to collect and easy to collect tax to
globalisation is accomplished by opening a larger ﬁscal gap, or by scaling down
government spending.15 At this point, we do not have suﬃcient data to allow us to do
more rigorous analysis beyond a simple period comparison reported in Figure 2(d).
Another possible empirical extension is to directly quantify tax eﬀort across countries.
We should also note that the presence of an informal economy may overstate the
eﬀective tax rates used throughout the paper. The association between tax revenue and
the informal sector in developing countries warrants further investigation.
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Notes
1. Developing countries’ reliance on easy to collect taxes has been explained by their limited institutional
capacities, political instability, and polarisation. Studies explaining the reliance on easy to collect taxes
in developing countries include Phelps (1973), Vegh (1989), Cukierman et al. (1992), Giovannini and
De-Melo (1993), Aizenman and Guidotti (1994), Emran and Stiglitz (2005), and Gordon and Li
(2007). The impact of globalisation on the pattern of taxation in the OECD countries has been the
focus of Rodrik (1998); see also Tanzi and Zee (2000) and Ebrill et al. (2002). Space considerations
limit our coverage of the large background literature dealing with public ﬁnance in developing
countries. See Aizenman and Jinjarak (2006), Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) and Slemrod (2007) for a
comprehensive survey and discussion.
2. This would be the case in countries where, due to political economy considerations, the initial tariﬀ
rate was set in order to maximise the tariﬀ revenue. One purpose of our analysis is to quantify the
ultimate revenue impact of tariﬀ cuts, allowing us to test which of the two eﬀects dominate. Similarly,
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macroeconomic stabilisation may increase economic growth, with ambiguous eﬀects on seigniorage.
Yet, if most countries operate on the ‘proper’ part of Laﬀer’s tax curve, one expects that globalisation
would reduce the tariﬀ and the seigniorage revenue/GDP ratios.
3. Low*, middle**, and upper income*** developing countries classiﬁcation is based on income and
regional classiﬁcation of the World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org/data/countryclass). Developing
countries are: Africa: Cameroon*, Gabon***, Guinea*, Lesotho*, Mauritius***, Namibia**, South
Africa***, Zambia*, Zimbabwe*; East Asia: Indonesia**, Korea***, Malaysia***, Myanmar*,
Thailand**; Eastern Europe: Azerbaijan**, Belarus**, Bulgaria**, Croatia***, Czech Republic***,
Estonia***, Hungary***, Latvia***, Lithuania***, Poland***, Romania**, Russian Federation***,
Turkey***; Latin America: Argentina***, Bolivia**, Brazil**, Chile***, Colombia**, Costa Rica***,
Mexico***, Nicaragua*, Paraguay**, Peru**, Trinidad and Tobago***, Uruguay***, Venezuela***;
Middle East and North Africa: Iran**, Morocco**, Tunisia**, South Asia: India*, Nepal*, Pakistan*,
Sri Lanka**. High-income countries are: Australia, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Iceland, Israel, Japan,
Malta, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom.
4. India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
5. A review of these methods can be found in Schneider (2004) and Alm et al. (2006).
6. See Fisman and Wei (2004) and Aizenman (2004) for ﬁscal implications of trade mis-invoicing.
7. Though interesting, there are no formal tests on the relationship between ﬁrm size distribution and tax
evasion across countries.
8. Admittedly, Institutional Quality covers a wide range of aspects.
9. We should also note that there is another, hard to measure but easy to collect tax – government
revenue from ﬁnancial repression. Government can impose controls on international capital ﬂows and
domestic ﬁnancial intermediaries as a form of taxation. The resultant wedge between eﬀective external
and domestic interest rates of public debt is the ﬁnancial repression tax, which is essentially a subsidy
on interest payments on government liabilities. As discussed in Giovannini and De-Melo (1993), there
are also potential complementarities between ﬁnancial repression revenue and seigniorage because (i)
inﬂation implies low real interest rates facing savers, and thus interest savings on government
liabilities, and (ii) negative real interest rates on savings increase money demand, that is, the inﬂation
tax base. Financial repression revenue is calculated by multiplying the stock of outstanding domestic
debt by the ﬁnancial repression tax rate, which is the interest rate diﬀerential in local currency between
the eﬀective external and domestic interest rates. Financial repression revenue may be negative (i.e. the
eﬀective foreign interest rate is smaller than the eﬀective domestic interest rate), reﬂecting a lower cost
of foreign borrowing relative to domestic borrowing facing a government. We focus on seigniorage
because there is a high positive correlation between seigniorage and government revenue from
ﬁnancial repression (about 0.50). Limited data availability on a panel of tax revenue from
ﬁnancial repression prevents us from adding this implicit tax to the ﬁgures dealing with easy to
collect taxes. Hence, these ﬁgures tend to understate the shrinking of easy to collect taxes in our
sample.
10. See for example Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Helpman et al. (2007).
11. A simple ﬁxed eﬀect regression of gravity trade share on time trend shows a statistically signiﬁcant
increase of 0.3 per cent per year from 1980 to 1999.
12. Argentina, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Morocco,
Pakistan, South Africa, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela,
Zambia and Zimbabwe.
13. The pan-European VAT system and tax base harmonisation debated in the European communities is
a good example. See for example Financial Times (2006) and Financial Times (2007).
14. For example, a standard deviation of the Trade Openness for developing countries is 2.2 per cent.
Using the coeﬃcient estimate of Trade Openness on hard to collect taxes from Table 2, which is 0.8
and statistically signiﬁcant, the eﬀect of a one standard deviation change of Trade Openness is to
increase hard to collect taxes by 2.26 0.8¼ 1.7 per cent of GDP.
15. See Rodrik (1998) for some discussion on globalisation and the size of government expenditures. In
addition, the ramiﬁcation of ﬁscal adjustment on macro economy in general is less well understood in
the case of developing countries. Talvi and Vegh (2005) study the association between tax base
volatility and macroeconomic policies in developing countries. For OECD, Alesina et al. (2002) found
that various types of taxes also have negative eﬀects on proﬁts but interestingly, the eﬀects of
government spending on investment are larger than those of taxes.
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Data Appendix
Tax revenues: The eﬀective rate of actual revenue collection as a percentage of GDP.
VAT (value added taxes), Income Taxes (corporate and personal taxes), and Tariﬀs
(imports and exports trade taxes) are from Oﬃce of Tax Policy Research at
University of Michigan; http://www.bus.umich.edu/OTPR/. Following Cukierman
et al. (1992), Seigniorage is constructed from changes in high-powered (reserve)
money from line 14 . . . ZF . . . of International Financial Statistics (IFS). By tax
eﬀort, Tariﬀs and Seigniorage are easy to collect taxes, whereas VAT and Income
Taxes are hard to collect taxes. All of the taxes are divided by GDP.
Globalisation variables: Trade Openness is constructed from gravity regression
methodology, using data from NBER-UN World Trade Flows (http://www.nber.
org/data/; values of exports and imports), Frankel and Rose (2002) (distance,
common oﬃcial language, common borders, land-area product), World Develop-
ment Indicators (WDI; population of trading partners, real GDP). Financial
Openness is imputed Quinn index from Edwards (2007).
Control variables: Institutional Quality is the composite index of good governance
from International Country Risk Guide (http://www.prsgroup.com/). Political
Durability is the number of years in power of incumbent government, from Political
IV Project (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm). Urbanisation and
Agricultural Share are from WDI. Government expenditure is from IFS. Weighted
tariﬀ rates are derived from reports of the World Bank-Operations Evaluation
Department.
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